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CRAWFORD & BEYOND: 
HOW FAR HAVE WE TRAVELED FROM 
ROBERTS AFTER ALL? 
Brooks Holland 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We have ridden the Crawford confrontation train for almost 
eight years.1 In Crawford, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled 
Ohio v. Roberts,2 and “discarded the reliability framework that 
had governed the admissibility of hearsay statements under the 
Confrontation Clause for more than twenty years.”3 In place of 
Roberts’ reliability framework, under which judges decided 
which hearsay evidence to admit without cross-examination, 
Crawford gave us a rule excluding “testimonial” hearsay at 
trial.4 
                                                          
 Assistant Professor and Gonzaga Law Foundation Scholar, Gonzaga 
University School of Law. In addition to teaching law, the author represents 
clients in criminal appeals before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, and previously served as a public defender in the Bronx and 
Manhattan. Laurel Yecny, a law student at Gonzaga, provided excellent 
research assistance for this paper. Many thanks to the editors at the Journal 
of Law and Policy for excellent editing. 
1 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004). 
2 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980). 
3 Brooks Holland, Testimonial Statements Under Crawford: What Makes 
Testimony . . . Testimonial?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 281, 281 (2005) 
[hereinafter Testimonial Statements]; see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (rejecting 
the argument that confrontation analysis can turn on “amorphous notions of 
‘reliability’”). 
4 See Hon. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, 
by, and for the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 37 (2008) (noting that in Crawford, “the Court shifted 
from ‘reliability’ to an as yet undefined ‘testimonial’ test”); see also 
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I boarded this Crawford train an enthusiastic passenger,5 
believing that Crawford promised real change in confrontation 
law to constrain trends such as “evidence-based” prosecutions—
where prosecutors proved cases largely through hearsay 
evidence without producing the declarant.6 We just needed to 
ride the Crawford train for a few more stops to learn precisely 
what evidence would qualify as “testimonial.”7 In Michigan v. 
Bryant,8 however, the Supreme Court returned to a multi-factor 
judicial test for deciding whether cross-examination of a non-
testifying declarant is needed, a test that resurrected the 
relevance of “reliability.”9 Bryant thus put the brakes on the 
Crawford train, and maybe even started its return to the Roberts 
station.10 
Following the Bryant decision, Brooklyn Law School hosted 
                                                          
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54 (introducing and explaining the concept of 
“testimonial” evidence under the Confrontation Clause, and holding that the 
confrontation right renders testimonial evidence inadmissible at trial absent an 
opportunity to cross-examine). 
5 See generally Testimonial Statements, supra note 3, at 281–95 
(embracing Crawford’s basic “testimonial” framework for confrontation 
analysis). 
6 See McClure v. Rehg, No. 4:07CV1686 FRB, 2007 WL 3352389, at 
*1 n.1 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (defining evidence-based prosecutions); Richard 
Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-in Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
1171, 1176–77 (2002) (exploring the growing trend of prosecutors 
introducing witness statements to 911 and the police without calling the 
witness at trial, particularly in domestic violence cases); Brooks Holland, 
Using Excited Utterances to Prosecute Domestic Violence in New York: The 
Door Opens Wide, or Just a Crack?, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 171, 175–79 
(2002) (reviewing trend of prosecutors using hearsay to prosecute cases 
without producing the victim to testify). 
7 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“We leave for another day any effort to 
spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”); see also Joelle Anne 
Moreno, Finding Nino: Justice Scalia’s Confrontation Clause Legacy from Its 
(Glorious) Beginnings to (Bitter) End, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1211, 1212–13 
(2011) (“[B]oth in and after Crawford, the Court has repeatedly refused to 
provide clear or consistent criteria distinguishing testimonial statements from 
the infinite range of out-of-court statements made by victims and witnesses 
during criminal investigations.”). 
8 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
9 See infra notes 34–49 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 50–57 and accompanying text. 
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its most recent “Crawford and Beyond” symposium.11 The 
learned presentations at this symposium prompted me to reflect 
on the point of Crawford, and where Crawford perhaps should 
have taken us. In the end, this reflection has made me more 
sympathetic to Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s caution in 
Crawford:  
[T]housands of federal prosecutors and the tens of 
thousands of state prosecutors need answers as to 
what . . . is covered by the new rule. They need them 
now, not months or years from now. Rules of criminal 
evidence are applied every day in courts throughout the 
country, and parties should not be left in the dark in this 
manner.12 
Crawford did spawn years of doctrinal uncertainty, an 
uncertainty that persists to date.13 These were good years for law 
professors,14 but difficult ones for lawyers and judges. If this 
protracted uncertainty was necessary to bring criminal practice 
into harmony with an important constitutional principle, lawyers 
and judges needed to tough it out. But, if this uncertainty merely 
                                                          
11 Brooklyn Law School has hosted three fantastic symposia exploring 
Crawford and subsequent Confrontation Clause developments. See 
Symposium, Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future of the 
Confrontation Clause in Light of Its Past, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2005); 
Symposium, Crawford and Beyond: Revisited in Dialogue, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 
333 (2007). 
12 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75–76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
13 See Jeffery Fisher, What Happened—and What is Happening—to the 
Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 587, 589 (2007) (“We have entered a 
brave new world of confrontation jurisprudence in which virtually no judges 
have experience applying even its basic governing principles.”); Moreno, 
supra note 7, at 1212, 1213 (noting that Crawford “generated a flurry of 
activity in the federal and state courts,” and “[w]ithout clear guidance, the 
lower courts have generated confused and inconsistent confrontation 
decisions”). As of January 18, 2012, Westlaw Keycite lists 10,416 court 
decisions citing to Crawford—an average of more than 2,000 judicial citations 
a year since Crawford was decided in March of 2004. By contrast, Westlaw 
Keycite lists 2,759 judicial citations to Roberts from 1980 to March 2004, 
before Crawford was decided. 
14 As of January 18, 2012, Westlaw Keycite lists 1,346 law review 
citations to Crawford. Westlaw Keycite lists 678 law review citations to 
Roberts between 1980 and March 2004. 
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resulted from the Supreme Court’s experimentation with 
different confrontation theories, only to return the law close to 
where it began, the real world of law may have benefitted from 
a bit more respect for stare decisis. 
This Essay will examine where this Crawford project took us, 
where it should have taken us instead, and whether the trip was 
worthwhile. Part II of this paper traces how the Crawford-Davis-
Bryant trajectory of decisions regarding “testimonial” evidence 
effectively returns us to Roberts—or perhaps to an even more 
narrow conception of confrontation rights than under Roberts. Part 
III outlines how confrontation rights could have been understood 
consistent with our modern adversary system of criminal 
adjudication, and where I believed the Crawford train was destined 
when it departed eight years ago. Part IV concludes that if the 
Supreme Court was not prepared to deliver confrontation law to an 
important and new constitutional principle through Crawford’s 
wholesale revision of existing doctrine, the Court should have 
heeded Chief Justice Rehnquist’s call for restraint. 
II. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE: A TURN BACK TO ROBERTS 
The Sixth Amendment provides that “in all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.”15 The Supreme 
Court has interpreted the Confrontation Clause to include a right 
to face-to-face confrontation with accusers as sworn witnesses 
before the trier of fact, and a right to cross-examine those 
witnesses.16 Roberts, however, held that this right could be 
satisfied when the prosecution introduced hearsay evidence from 
a non-testifying declarant, so long as the evidence proved 
sufficiently reliable. The prosecution could demonstrate this 
reliability by showing that the evidence either fell within a 
“firmly-rooted” hearsay exception or contained judicially-
determined guarantees of trustworthiness.17 
                                                          
15 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
16 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845–46 (1990) (reviewing 
confrontation jurisprudence dating to the nineteenth century). 
17 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
 Crawford and Beyond 521 
Crawford rejected Roberts’ “amorphous, if not entirely 
subjective”18 reliability framework for confrontation. In the 
Crawford Court’s view, “[d]ispensing with confrontation 
because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with 
jury trial because the defendant is obviously guilty.”19 Thus, the 
Court concluded, the prosecution may not introduce testimonial 
evidence against a defendant without producing the declarant for 
cross-examination, “unless the declarant [is] unavailable and the 
defendant[] had a prior opportunity [for cross-examination].”20 
The question became what evidence the Court would count 
as testimonial, and therefore subject to Crawford’s rule of 
exclusion. Relying on historical reference points, Crawford 
included testimony given at a preliminary hearing, before a 
grand jury, and during a former trial, as well as statements 
given during a precinct police interrogation.21 The Court “[left] 
for another day,” however, the task of “spell[ing] out a 
comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”22 
The Court next undertook this task in Davis v. Washington.23 
Davis involved two separate domestic violence cases. Prior to 
Crawford, prosecutors frequently employed excited utterances 
and other hearsay evidence to prove domestic violence cases 
without producing the victim-declarant.24 In Davis, the victim 
called 911 and said that Davis had assaulted her and fled the 
location.25 In a companion case, Hammon v. Indiana, the police 
responded to the victim’s home following a domestic disturbance 
                                                          
18 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004). 
19 Id. at 62. 
20 See id. at 68 (“Where testimonial evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth 
Amendment demands . . . unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.”); see also Fisher, supra note 13, at 587–88 (explaining that 
Crawford “prohibits the prosecution from introducing out-of-court 
‘testimonial’ statements unless the declarants are unavailable and defendants 
had a prior opportunity to cross examine them”). 
21 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
22 Id. 
23 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
24 See id. at 817, 819; see also Friedman & McCormack, supra note 6, 
at 1180–81 (commenting in 2002 on the admissibility of 911 calls in domestic 
violence cases, two years before the Crawford decision). 
25 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 817–19. 
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report.26 The police separated the victim and Hammon, and the 
victim told the police that Hammon had assaulted her.27 The 
victims did not testify at trial, and the defendants argued that the 
victims’ out-of-court statements were “testimonial” under 
Crawford, thus precluding their admission absent cross-
examination.28 
In resolving the confrontation challenges to these two 
instances of hearsay evidence, the Court split the outcome: the 
declarant’s statement to 911 in Davis was ruled non-
testimonial,29 but the victim’s statement to the responding 
officers in Hammon was deemed testimonial.30 Thus, under 
Crawford, no confrontation was required at all in Davis—the 
State was free to prove Davis’ guilt through the 911 record 
without cross-examination of the declarant or any other 
confrontation requirement. In Hammon, however, cross-
examination was mandated, or else the declarant’s statement had 
to be excluded from trial. 
This critical constitutional line was demarcated by a new 
confrontation test that the Court articulated to refine Crawford’s 
incomplete definition of testimonial evidence: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course 
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively 
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is 
to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances 
indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and 
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution.31 
This test and its application in Davis left several questions 
unresolved about the definition of “testimonial” evidence.32 But 
                                                          
26 See id. at 819–21. 
27 See id. 
28 See id. at 818–19, 821. 
29 See id. at 828–29. 
30 See id. at 830–31. 
31 Id. at 822. 
32 These questions included what distinguishes an “ongoing emergency” 
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Davis did appear to answer one question: analysis of whether 
hearsay evidence is “testimonial” under the Confrontation 
Clause is completely removed from the lawyers, witnesses, and 
arguments in the courtroom where that hearsay evidence is being 
offered.33 Instead, the Court divined whether the declarants’ 
statements proved testimonial in Davis and Hammon by looking 
solely to the “primary purpose” of the exchange between the 
declarant and the police at the time and place of those 
statements, many months before the trial. 
Bryant reaffirmed this pre-trial focal point of the Crawford 
confrontation framework. In Bryant, the police encountered the 
declarant lying in the street after being shot.34 The police asked 
the declarant “what had happened, who had shot him, and where 
the shooting had occurred.”35 The declarant answered that 
“Rick” shot him.36 The declarant also gave a time, location, and 
brief description of the shooting.37 The declarant died later that 
                                                          
from an investigation of past events, and whose perspective bears on the 
“primary purpose” of the investigation: the declarant’s, the police officer’s, 
or both. See generally, e.g., Fisher, supra note 13, at 617–18 (questioning 
predictability of Davis’ objective test for assessing the primary purpose of an 
interrogation); Richard Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15 
J.L. & POL’Y 553, 561–63 (2007) (arguing that Davis should be understood 
to analyze evidence from the perspective of the declarant, not the police or a 
combination of parties to a conversation); Deborah Tuerkheimer, A 
Relational Approach to the Right of Confrontation and Its Loss, 15 J.L. & 
POL’Y 725, 728–35 (2007) (questioning how Davis’ “binary” emergency-past 
events framework will apply accurately in domestic violence cases). 
33 The Court in Crawford did limit its confrontation rule to hearsay 
evidence offered at trial for the truth of the matter asserted. See Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004). But the Court made clear that 
hearsay evidence and testimonial evidence should be defined separately. See 
id. at 51. 
34 See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011). For a thorough 
examination of the factual record in Bryant, see Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., 
Michigan v. Bryant: The Counter-Revolution Begins 2–6 (UCLA Sch. of Law, 
Research Paper No. 11-07, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1798 
877. 
35 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
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morning.38 At Bryant’s subsequent murder trial, the court 
admitted the declarant’s statements to the police into evidence as 
excited utterances.39 
On appeal, Bryant argued that admission of the declarant’s 
statements identifying the shooter violated Crawford because he 
could not cross-examine the declarant at trial.40 The Supreme 
Court disagreed, finding the declarant’s statements non-
testimonial. In the process, the Court used this case as an 
opportunity to “provide additional clarification of what Davis 
meant by ‘the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable 
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.’”41  
As in Davis, the Court in Bryant looked solely to the time and 
place of the exchange between the declarant and the police to 
determine whether the declarant’s statements were testimonial. 
The Court sought in this exchange objective proof of either a 
crime investigation, which would require confrontation later at 
trial, or an emergency, in which case the purpose of the 
questioning “is not to create a record for trial and thus is not 
within the scope of the Clause.”42 The Court employed a multi-
factor judicial test to identify the objective primary purpose of the 
exchange.43 This test considers the statements, actions, and 
perspectives of both the police and the declarant when the pre-
trial statement was procured.44 Moreover, “standard rules of 
hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be 
relevant.”45 In particular, the Court analogized the newly-minted 
                                                          
38 See id. 
39 See id. at 1150–51 & n.1. 
40 See id. at 1150–51. 
41 Id. at 1156. 
42 Id. at 1155. 
43 Commentators have extracted anywhere from eight to a dozen potential 
factors to be considered under the Bryant test. See Michael D. Cicchini, 
Dead Again: The Latest Demise of the Confrontation Clause, 80 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1301, 1309–10 (2011) (identifying, for example, the formality of the 
interrogation producing the declarant’s statement, whether a weapon was used 
during the alleged crime, the medical condition of the declarant, as well as 
other factors); Graham, supra note 34, at 28; Moreno, supra note 7, at 1245. 
44 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160–61. 
45 Id. at 1155. 
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emergency-investigation distinction in confrontation law to the 
“logic . . . justifying the excited utterance exception in hearsay 
law,”46 because “[a]n ongoing emergency has a similar effect of 
focusing an individual’s attention on responding to the 
emergency,”47 rather than on fabricating evidence.48 Thus, “the 
Confrontation Clause does not require such statements to be 
subject to the crucible of cross-examination.”49 
One commentator recently complained that after Bryant, the 
Confrontation Clause is “dead again.”50 Bryant certainly returns 
confrontation law to a malleable judicial test that invites judges to 
decide whether out-of-court statements inspire sufficient 
confidence to dispense with cross-examination at trial.51 Nor does 
the Court’s recent confrontation jurisprudence hint at impending 
limits to the pro-admission trajectory that Bryant sets. The six-
Justice Bryant majority included the four vocal dissenters from 
two recent confrontation decisions that did apply Crawford’s rule 
                                                          
46 Id. at 1157. 
47 Id. 
48 See id. (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990)). 
49 Id. at 1157. 
50 Cicchini, supra note 43, at 1302–04 (“[T]he Confrontation Clause, for 
all practical purposes, died in 1980 with the Court’s decision in Ohio v. 
Roberts,” and following Davis and Bryant, “[t]he Confrontation Clause is 
dead again.”). 
51 Cf. Graham, supra note 34, at 1, 29–30 (arguing that Bryant 
“effectively overruled Crawford and pushed confrontation doctrine back in 
the direction of Roberts,” and the “majority’s analysis of the exception for 
excited utterances demonstrates the lengths they will go to aid prosecutors”); 
Marc Chase McAllister, Evading Confrontation: From One Amorphous 
Standard to Another, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 473, 492–93 (2011) (observing 
that Bryant’s totality-of-circumstances test “is strikingly reminiscent of the 
discredited Roberts framework” and “makes case results unpredictable and 
provides easy means for courts to dispense with actual confrontation” 
(citations omitted)); Moreno, supra note 7, at 1218 (“Bryant will lead to the 
admission of more prosecutor-sponsored statements that defendants cannot 
exclude from witnesses whom defendants cannot confront,” and “will almost 
inevitably exacerbate the problem of erratic and inconsistent decisions.”); 
Jason Widdison, Comment, Michigan v. Bryant, The Ghost of Roberts and 
the Return of Reliability, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 219, 230 (2011) (contending that 
Bryant undermined Crawford “by reintroducing reliability to the Court’s 
Sixth Amendment analysis”).  
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of exclusion: Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,52 and Bullcoming 
v. New Mexico.53 Those dissents evince that, to these Justices, 
confrontation is a flexible right that ensures “a fair trial with 
reliable evidence.”54 Thus, in these Justices’ view, Melendez-Diaz 
and Bullcoming improperly “treated the reliability of evidence as 
a reason to exclude it.”55 Four Justices consequently appear 
committed to the core principle of Roberts: judges may dispense 
with a defendant’s right to confrontation on a finding that a non-
testifying declarant likely did not fabricate a pre-trial statement. 
Justice Clarence Thomas, by comparison, consistently has 
supported a very narrow definition of testimonial evidence, 
including only formal, solemnized pre-trial statements.56 In total, 
therefore, five current Justices could vote for broad admission of 
hearsay evidence without cross-examination at trial. Regardless of 
how aggressively Bryant’s author, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, will 
push her primary purpose test,57 evidence-based prosecutions 
easily may become prevalent again. 
If anyone doubts the elasticity built into Bryant, one need 
                                                          
52 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
53 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2011) (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting). The dissenters in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming included 
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Stephen Breyer, 
and Samuel Alito. 
54 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
55 Id. 
56 See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1167 (2011) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (criticizing the “primary purpose” test as “‘an exercise in fiction’ 
that is ‘disconnected from history’ and ‘yields no predictable results’” 
(quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 835, 838–39 (2006) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))). 
57 Justice Sotomayor joined the Court subsequent to the Davis decision. 
She concurred separately in Bullcoming, listing several nuanced “factual 
scenarios” not presented by the expert report admitted in Bullcoming. See 
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2721–23 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Whether she 
will switch sides from Bullcoming according to one of these factual scenarios 
may be revealed this term in Williams v. Illinois. Williams v. Illinois, 939 
N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (June 28, 2011) (No. 
10-8337). Justice Elena Kagan recused herself in Bryant, and she joined the 
Bullcoming opinion only in part. Justice Kagan thus may not have voted yet 
in a manner that fully reveals her views on confrontation. 
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only consider the decision in United States v. Solorio.58 Solorio 
was charged with selling drugs to a confidential informant 
during an undercover “buy bust” operation.59 During the 
informant’s purchase of drugs, two undercover DEA agents 
observed the interactions between the informant and Solorio, and 
radioed their observations to the arrest team.60 The arrest team 
agents did not observe these events. At trial, the Government 
did not call the two officers who personally observed the 
informant and Solorio interact.61 Instead, “for reasons not 
explained in the record,”62 the Government called arrest team 
agents to testify to the radioed surveillance observations of the 
non-testifying agents.63 The trial court admitted these hearsay 
statements as a present sense impression.64 
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, Solorio argued that these statements were 
testimonial and therefore inadmissible under Crawford, absent 
cross-examination. Invoking Bryant, the Ninth Circuit disagreed. 
The court accepted the Government’s argument that the non-
testifying agents “communicated their observations to the other 
agents to ensure the success and safety of the operation, by 
assuring that all agents involved knew what was happening and 
enabling them to gauge their actions accordingly.”65 Thus, the 
court observed, “objectively assessed, the ‘primary purpose’ of 
the agents’ statements was assuring that the arrest effort both 
succeeded and did not escalate into a dangerous situation, not ‘to 
create a record for trial.’”66 The court accordingly held that 
“‘the Confrontation Clause does not require such statements to 
be subject to the crucible of cross-examination,’” because “‘the 
                                                          
58 United States v. Solorio, No. 10-10304, 2012 WL 161843 (9th Cir. 
Jan. 19, 2012). 
59 Id. at *1–2. 
60 Id. at *1–2, 4–5. 
61 Id. at *4–5. 
62 Id. at *7. 
63 Id. at *4–5. 
64 Id. at *4. The trial court did not rule on a confrontation objection to 
this evidence. See id. at *4 n.6. 
65 Id. at *7. 
66 Id. at *8 (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011)). 
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prospect of fabrication’ in statements” given for this purpose is 
presumably “‘significantly diminished.’”67 
The Solorio decision’s underlying rationale was not limited 
by unique case-specific facts, and instead relied on facts 
common to most undercover operations. Undercover operations 
of every kind present risks of danger or failure. Through this 
decision, therefore, Bryant appears to have gifted prosecutors 
with a fairly broad template for trying undercover operations 
without subjecting key witnesses to cross-examination. 
Defendants instead will confront only the recipients of hearsay 
statements about alleged criminal activity, so long as those 
statements, in the trial judge’s opinion, objectively were made 
“to ensure the success and safety of the operation.”68  
Crawford thus has followed a round-trip trajectory since its 
departure in 2004. From an early promise of robust protection of 
confrontation rights at trial, Crawford has circled back to an easily-
narrowed conception of confrontation, authorizing judges to decide 
when cross-examination—or any other confrontation priority—must 
be preserved. Indeed, Crawford may conceive of confrontation 
even more narrowly than Roberts did, because outside of 
testimonial evidence, Crawford attaches no confrontation interests 
to hearsay evidence.69 Roberts, by contrast, extended confrontation 
interests to hearsay evidence broadly.70 As a result, if Roberts did 
“kill” confrontation thirty years ago, confrontation post-Bryant may 
be “dead again”—or even more dead.71 
                                                          
67 Id. (quoting Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157). 
68 Id. at *7. 
69 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); David Alan 
Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, in THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW, 2009, at 
1, 5 (Dennis J. Hutchinson et al. eds., 2010) (“[T]he Court has made clear 
that the introduction of nontestimonial statements raises no constitutional 
concerns, no matter how the statements are treated under the hearsay rule.”); 
Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause 1, 3, 5 (S. 
Methodist Univ. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 84, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1956748 (noting that the constriction of testimonial 
evidence following Davis and Bryant excludes a wide range of hearsay 
evidence from confrontation protection). 
70 See Bellin, supra note 69, at 9 (“Roberts treated testimonial and 
nontestimonial statements identically.”). 
71 Cicchini, supra note 43, at 1302–04. 
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III. WHERE CRAWFORD COULD HAVE TAKEN CONFRONTATION: A 
TRIAL RIGHT IN AN ADVERSARY PROCESS 
One commentator has pinned this trajectory of confrontation 
law on an “ill-advised attempt by Justice Scalia to fashion the 
confrontation clause in a manner only he, if anyone, is willing 
to accept as fundamentally sound and consistent in history, 
logic, and practice.”72 Yet Justice Scalia persuaded a majority of 
the Court to join his confrontation project, even if that train now 
has derailed.73 On reflection, however, that train was destined to 
derail, because Crawford’s framework inevitably encouraged 
judges to narrow confrontation rights to avoid Crawford’s harsh 
exclusionary rule.74 If the Confrontation Clause ultimately must 
permit discretionary judicial decision making, better that 
discretion apply to how to enforce that right, not to the 
definition of the right itself. By treating confrontation more 
accurately as a trial right in an adversary process, the Court 
could have realized this balance from Crawford. 
Crawford observed that the Confrontation Clause “applies to 
‘witnesses’ against the accused—in other words, those who ‘bear 
testimony.’”75 The Court explained further that “‘[t]estimony,’ in 
turn, is typically ‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for 
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’”76 If, however, 
“testimonial” evidence is the lynchpin for whether a declarant is a 
“witness” to be confronted, the Court has not adequately explained 
why it looks solely to the time and place of a pre-trial statement to 
determine whether it proves “testimonial,” and does not consider 
the trial purpose for which the prosecuting lawyer offers that 
evidence as the more accurate measure of the statement’s purpose.  
I assume that the Court’s focus on out-of-court facts in 
                                                          
72 6 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 
802:2.2 (7th ed. 2011). 
73 Justice Scalia made quite clear in his Bryant dissent that the Court has 
mutated, if not destroyed, his original confrontation project. See Bryant, 131 
S. Ct. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]oday’s opinion distorts our 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in a shambles.”). 
74 See infra notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
75 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). 
76 Id. 
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defining testimonial evidence results from Crawford’s heavy 
historical emphasis on the founding era, when criminal trials did 
not involve institutionalized prosecution and defense bars 
marshaling and challenging evidence in an adversary system.77 
Focus on the primary purpose of evidence when it was gathered 
during an investigation might be more meaningful in a “civil-law 
mode of criminal procedure.”78 But in the 21st century criminal 
justice system, a trial lawyer’s purpose in admitting evidence 
defines the precise nature of that evidence.79 Therefore, it makes 
marginal sense to judge whether a hearsay declarant has borne 
witness against a defendant at trial by inspecting solely the 
procurement of the declarant’s statement by the police, months 
or years prior to the trial.80  
The Court in Davis acknowledged that criminal procedure 
institutions and practices have changed since the founding era, 
and that these changes should inform how courts evaluate 
                                                          
77 See id. at 42–50. 
78 Id. at 50; cf. Thomas Davies, Not the “Framers’ Design”: How the 
Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis 
“Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 
15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 355, 365–68 (2007) (criticizing the Crawford opinion’s 
reliance on originalist methodology because it “fail[s] to grasp—or admit—the 
degree to which legal doctrine and legal institutions have changed since the 
framing”). 
79 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404 (barring introduction of evidence of a 
character trait or prior act in order to prove propensity, but permitting 
introduction of that same evidence if offered to prove, for example, motive or 
modus operandi); FED. R. EVID. 407 (barring introduction of subsequent 
remedial measures to prove, inter alia, negligence, but permitting it for other 
purposes, such as impeachment); FED. R. EVID. 801 (barring the admission 
of out-of-court statements if offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but 
permitting their introduction for other purposes, such as their effect on the 
listener). 
80 Cf. Testimonial Statements, supra note 3, at 284 (questioning the 
“view [of confrontation that] focuses on the circumstances surrounding an 
out-of-court statement instead of the trial at which it is offered, which for 
confrontation purposes may be asking the wrong question”). Professor 
Josephine Ross has advocated a comparable position. See Josephine Ross, 
After Crawford Double-Speak: “Testimony” Does Not Mean Testimony and 
“Witness” Does Not Mean Witness, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 
196–209 (2006). 
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whether evidence is testimonial.81 Yet the Court erred when it 
asserted that, as a result of those changes, we “no longer have 
examining Marian magistrates,”82 but “we do have, as our 18th-
century forebears did not, examining police officers.”83 In our 
modern criminal justice system, we have investigating police 
officers prior to trial; at trial, where confrontation applies, we 
have “examining” prosecuting lawyers. 
Confrontation law should reflect this reality, where the intent 
of prosecuting lawyers, not of declarants and the police, defines 
the nature of trial evidence. An old evidence law cliché 
illustrates this distinction. A lawyer presents a plate of spaghetti 
to a witness.84 The spaghetti is not offered to prove something 
about that plate of spaghetti. Rather, the spaghetti is offered to 
refresh the witness’ memory of some fact, or to test whether the 
witness can recognize spaghetti. The law thus does not evaluate 
when, where, why, and by whom that spaghetti was prepared in 
deciding whether the spaghetti may be offered, because the 
lawyer is not attempting to prove a fact about that particular 
plate of spaghetti—it is simply an object to trigger memory, or 
to test perception. If, however, the lawyer at trial offers that 
same plate of spaghetti as the plate of spaghetti at issue in the 
case, the law will condition the spaghetti’s admissibility on a 
showing of authenticity and chain of custody. The point is, how 
lawyers marshal and use evidence at trial determines what the 
evidence is in that trial—whether that same plate of spaghetti is 
just a physical object to awaken memory, a plate of spaghetti to 
test perception, or the plate of spaghetti subject to litigation at 
trial. The “objective primary purpose” with which the spaghetti 
originally was prepared cannot alone define the purpose for 
which the trial lawyer has offered the spaghetti as trial evidence. 
                                                          
81 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 n.5 (2006) (“Restricting 
the Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against which it was originally 
directed is a recipe for its extinction.”). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Cf., e.g., Jennifer Brown, Cross-Examining the Difficult Witness: Tips 
for Women Defenders Navigating Gender Dynamics in the Courtroom, 
CHAMPION, Apr. 2011, at 20, available at http://www.nacdl.org/Champion. 
aspx?id=16224. 
532 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Similarly, when a court considers whether a hearsay 
statement supplies testimonial evidence, the objective primary 
purpose of that statement when it was made reveals little about 
whether the declarant has borne witness at the later trial when it 
is introduced. Imagine a witness who testified before a grand 
jury, all with the clear objective purpose of establishing facts for 
a future trial. This sounds like a good case for testimonial 
evidence under Crawford.85 But the prosecutor at trial offers that 
grand jury testimony only to show that this witness testified 
before a grand jury, not to prove any facts asserted by that 
testimony. The grand jury testimony should not constitute 
“testimonial” evidence as used in this trial, regardless of its 
primary purpose when created, because the lawyer offering it 
did not attempt to prove any fact from those statements.86  
By contrast, consider a person who comments casually about 
a fact to a friend at a party. Under Crawford itself, let alone 
Davis and Bryant, this statement seems a weak candidate for 
testimonial evidence87—and properly so if we are asking solely 
whether the person “testified” at the time and place of the casual 
comment to the friend. But if the prosecutor offers this statement 
at trial to prove the fact expressed in this statement, the 
prosecutor has employed the statements as testimonial evidence 
at trial. Regardless of the primary purpose of the statement 
when made, at trial the prosecutor has offered it to prove this 
fact as true and accurate according to the declarant.88 
The Court has acknowledged this important investigation-
trial dichotomy in confrontation analysis, recognizing that 
                                                          
85 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (holding that 
“testimonial” covers prior testimony before a grand jury). 
86 See id. at 51 (testimony involves “[a] solemn declaration or 
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
87 See id. (“An off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable evidence 
and thus a good candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules, but it bears little 
resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted. . . . 
An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears 
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an 
acquaintance does not.”). 
88 See id.  
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confrontation is a trial right and not a right against police abuses 
during investigation.89 An exigency can alter whether a search 
proves reasonable, because Fourth Amendment rights arise at 
the time of the search.90 Whether a pre-trial statement addresses 
an emergency or anything else, however, does not determine 
how a prosecuting lawyer has employed that evidence at a later 
trial, consistent with the trial right of confrontation. Yet the 
Court still fixates on the interaction between the police and the 
declarant in deciding whether that evidence is testimonial at the 
later trial. And for some reason, the existence of an emergency 
when a statement is made predetermines that the prosecution 
cannot employ it as testimonial evidence at trial. The 
Constitution locks evidence into testimonial or non-testimonial 
form months or years before the trial even begins.  
Crawford thus inexplicably authorizes declarants and the 
police, not the trial lawyers, to dictate whether evidence at trial 
operates as testimony. A single word from an important passage 
in Bryant reveals this failure in confrontation analysis, but a 
simple revision can resolve it. In Bryant, the Court held that 
confrontation rights extend to statements “procured with a 
primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony.”91 I would embrace this statement if it instead 
extended confrontation rights to statements “[introduced at trial] 
with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for 
trial testimony.” Whatever history may say about 16th- and 
17th-century criminal procedure abuses, in my experience this 
modified statement from Bryant more accurately reflects how 
lawyers and judges define evidence in criminal trials today. The 
Constitution should not defy the reality of how contemporary 
criminal cases are tried.92 
                                                          
89 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832 n.6 (2006) (“The 
Confrontation Clause in no way governs police conduct, because it is the trial 
use of, not the investigatory collection of, ex parte testimonial statements 
which offends that provision.”). 
90 See generally Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).  
91 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011) (emphasis added). 
92 Cf. Graham, supra note 34, at 30–31 (criticizing Bryant for ignoring 
the investigation-trial dichotomy in confrontation analysis); Ross, supra note 
80, at 196–201 (proposing that “‘[t]estimonial’ should mean statements that 
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When I advanced this vision of testimonial evidence at the 
recent Crawford and Beyond symposium, a participant inquired 
whether I meant to define all hearsay evidence as testimonial 
and thus subject to Crawford’s rule of exclusion.93 To me, this 
question implicates two considerations.  
First, my understanding of testimonial evidence may track 
closely to the definition of hearsay. But I do not perceive this 
relationship as a flaw. Like confrontation doctrine, the hearsay 
rule also concerns itself with the opportunity to cross-examine.94 
And the intent of the examining lawyer at trial largely guides the 
court in judging whether evidence constitutes hearsay, not the 
“objective purpose” of the declarant and interrogator in creating 
the evidence.95 Perhaps the Confrontation Clause could best be 
understood as the inverse of the confrontation view, embraced in 
Roberts and rejected in Crawford, that “[the Confrontation 
Clause’s] application to out-of-court statements introduced at 
                                                          
function as testimony during the trial,” not statements that function as 
testimony at the time and place of evidence production). Indeed, as the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged, the Confrontation Clause is not concerned 
with whether a defendant had any opportunity to cross-examine the declarant 
when the out-of-court statement was made, only when the evidence is offered 
at trial. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 159 (1970) (“[T]he inability 
to cross-examine the witness at the time he made his prior statement cannot 
easily be shown to be of crucial significance as long as the defendant is 
assured of full and effective cross-examination at the time of trial.”). 
Whether that evidence necessitates confrontation thus should be defined by its 
use at trial, where the right to cross-examine exists. 
93 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (“[N]ot all hearsay implicates the Sixth 
Amendment’s core concerns.”). 
94 See generally United States v. Owens, 789 F.2d 750, 756 (9th Cir. 
1986), overruled on other grounds, 484 U.S. 554 (1988) (“The reliability 
concerns of the rule against hearsay have been satisfied when ‘the 
witness . . . is subject to cross-examination.’”(quoting United States v. Fiore, 
443 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1971))). 
95 See United States v. Linwood, 142 F.3d 418, 425 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(“[W]hether a statement is hearsay . . . will most often hinge on the purpose 
for which it is offered.”). For an examination of prosecution arguments for 
offering trial evidence “not for the truth of the matter asserted,” see Jeffrey 
L. Fisher, The Truth About the “Not for the Truth” Exception to Crawford, 
CHAMPION, Feb. 2008, at 18. 
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trial depends upon ‘the law of Evidence for the time being.’”96 
Instead, the Confrontation Clause simply could constrain the 
State from legislating or adjudicating policy exceptions to trial 
cross-examination of a hearsay declarant in criminal cases. Some 
commentators have argued that Crawford should have subjected 
more hearsay to confrontation limitations.97 This approach even 
may have a stronger historical basis than Crawford’s focus on 
“testimonial” evidence.98  
More than tracking hearsay law, however, my suggested 
approach may bring testimonial evidence under the Sixth 
Amendment closer to the meaning and role of testimonial 
evidence under the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause:99 
an assertion that the prosecuting lawyer has introduced to prove 
a fact against the accused at the trial itself.100 But regardless of 
                                                          
96 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50–51. 
97 See, e.g., John R. Grimm, Note, A Wavering Bright Line: How 
Crawford v. Washington Denies Defendants a Consistent Confrontation 
Right, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 185, 211–15 (2011); cf. Robert P. Mosteller, 
Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of 
Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 615–23 (2005) (advocating 
confrontation framework for “accusatory hearsay”). 
98 See Davies, supra note 78, at 352, 434 (explaining that, contrary to 
Crawford’s historical position, “the framing-era sources indicate that the 
confrontation right itself prohibited the use of hearsay statements as evidence 
of the defendant’s guilt,” and “[a]dmitting unsworn, ‘nontestimonial’ hearsay 
was not part of ‘the Framers’ design’”). 
99 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”). 
100 See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988) (“[T]o be 
testimonial, an accused communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, 
relate a factual assertion or disclose information.”); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 
U.S. 760, 766–67 (2003) (“Martinez was never made to be a ‘witness’ 
against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination 
Clause because his statements were never admitted as testimony against him 
in a criminal case.” (emphasis added)); cf. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 
582, 590–91 (1990) (finding defendant’s response to police questions non-
testimonial, because the prosecutor introduced this evidence to show 
defendant’s physically slurred speech, not to prove defendant’s knowledge, 
thoughts, or beliefs); Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Toward a Unified 
Theory of Testimonial Evidence under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 80 
TEMP. L. REV. 1135, 1135 (2007) (examining definitional differences of 
“testimonial” between the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause and 
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whether confrontation law defines testimonial evidence separately 
from hearsay evidence, as Crawford and Davis indicated it 
should,101 confrontation rights should turn on the prosecuting 
lawyer’s purpose for that evidence at trial, not the objective 
purpose for which that evidence was procured during the 
investigation.102 
Second, concern about a broad definition of testimonial 
evidence that tracks hearsay law, I suspect, reacts to Crawford’s 
rule of exclusion, which can transform confrontation rights into a 
perceived “windfall” for defendants.103 Professor Robert Mosteller 
presciently predicted the response to this perception following 
Crawford: 
Crawford places a bold “stop sign” in the way of the 
admission of statements in this core area when 
confrontation is not provided. Given the damaging impact 
on prosecutions—a “stop sign” for the statement if it is 
testimonial—tremendous pressure will be placed on courts 
to narrow the definition [of testimonial evidence].104 
                                                          
the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, and advancing a unified theory 
of testimonial evidence). 
 Of course, under the Fifth Amendment, courts do analyze the 
circumstances surrounding how the police procured a suspect’s statement in 
determining its admissibility. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 
(1980) (defining interrogation to include “any words or actions on the part of 
the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response from the suspect”). But this analysis does not address 
whether the suspect’s statement is testimonial. Rather, unlike the 
Confrontation Clause, the Fifth Amendment also concerns itself with whether 
the police obtained a statement through coercive pretrial interrogation, 
necessitating analysis of these pretrial circumstances in addition to whether 
the statement constitutes testimonial evidence in its use at trial. 
101 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006); Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 51. 
102 Cf. Cicchini, supra note 43, at 1320–21 (“The inquiry should not be on 
the facts and circumstances of how a hearsay statement was allegedly made . . . . 
Nor should it be on how a hearsay statement was allegedly collected . . . . [T]he 
proper inquiry to determine whether a statement is testimonial involves the 
statement’s use at trial.”); Ross, supra note 80, at 196–201. 
103 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 833. 
104 Mosteller, supra note 97, at 516. 
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As I indicated at the Crawford and Beyond symposium, I am not 
sold on Crawford’s absolute rule of exclusion not only for the 
practical reason suggested by Professor Mosteller, but also in 
my understanding of trial confrontation generally. 
In my experience trying criminal cases, the confrontation 
right is not best understood as a “stop sign” against a narrow 
class of evidence. Rather, confrontation is part of an adversary 
process designed to ensure a fair trial.105 In this process, the 
prosecution carries the burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but both sides are represented by competent counsel 
before a judicial officer and unbiased jury. From this process-
focused view should flow a broadly-defined trial right connected 
to a realistic set of confrontation priorities, not an exclusionary 
rule that eliminates only a very narrow range of evidence. 
Crawford hitched confrontation’s wagon to an exclusionary 
rule without clearly defining the right itself. A narrowed 
confrontation right inevitably followed. Many defendants now 
are left with no exclusionary rule or any other confrontation 
interest to assert when hearsay is admitted from a non-testifying 
declarant, because only a limited class of testimonial evidence 
implicates confrontation rights.106 Instead of placing a 
constitutional “stop sign” before testimonial evidence, Crawford 
should have been understood to introduce a series of important 
confrontation priorities—priorities that frame confrontation less 
as a rule of evidence admissibility and more as a critical 
ingredient to a fair adversarial trial. 
The first priority is that the prosecution should produce for 
                                                          
105 Cf. Testimonial Statements, supra note 3, at 285 (defining 
“testimony” in light of its role in a process of criminal adjudication). 
106 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; Sklansky, supra note 69, at 1, 5 
(“[T]he Court has made clear that the introduction of nontestimonial 
statements raises no constitutional concerns, no matter how the statements are 
treated under the hearsay rule.”); cf. Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing 
Confrontation after Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 271, 288–325 (2006) 
(reconceptualizing confrontation as a policy issue, and proposing legislative 
reforms to protect confrontation interests excluded from Crawford and 
Davis); Bellin, supra note 69, at 1, 3, 5 (noting that the constriction of 
testimonial evidence following Davis and Bryant excludes a wide range of 
hearsay evidence from confrontation protection, and advocating that 
confrontation rights extend to limit the use of non-testimonial hearsay). 
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cross-examination any available witness whose pre-trial 
statement is being offered “for the purpose of establishing or 
proving some fact” against the defendant.107 Availability is key. 
The prosecution should not be able to choose, by stratagem or 
lack of diligence, whether a defendant cross-examines the 
sources of testimonial evidence.108 This prosecutorial practice, in 
my experience, supplied the most widespread confrontation 
problems under Roberts, and now perhaps under Crawford and 
Bryant.109 A confrontation rule that constrains this practice would 
do a lot more to ensure fair criminal trials today than would a 
historically pure vision of 17th-century abuses. 
If a prosecution can show true unavailability of a declarant, 
however, the prosecution has not elected to deprive the 
defendant of cross-examination.110 Unavailability begins to 
implicate legitimate concerns for both necessity and equity in an 
adversary process. Crawford thus identifies the next 
confrontation priority: where cross-examination at trial is not 
possible, the prosecution should give the defendant a pre-trial 
opportunity to examine the declarant.111 Rarely will this pre-trial 
                                                          
107 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
108 See, e.g., United States v. Solorio, No. 10-10304, 2012 WL 161843, 
at *7–8 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 2012). 
109 See, e.g., Testimonial Statements, supra note 3. I do not mean to 
suggest that prosecutors never have good reasons for proceeding in this 
manner. In many domestic violence cases, for example, prosecutors face 
challenges in producing the victim for trial, challenges that may reflect the 
defendant’s misconduct. See generally Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the 
Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of Domestic 
Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 367–74 (1996) (exploring difficulties 
in prosecution); Thomas L. Kirsch, Problems in Domestic Violence: Should 
Victims Be Forced to Participate in the Prosecution of Their Abusers?, 7 
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 383, 392–98 (2001) (reviewing challenges). I 
am arguing only that the prosecution should not be able to choose whether a 
defendant confronts a prosecution witness at trial, a choice I have witnessed 
prosecutors make in numerous cases. 
110 For an example of unavailability, see Hardy v. Cross, 132 S. Ct. 490, 
495 (2011). 
111 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. For insightful questions and comments 
about prior opportunities to cross-examine under Crawford, see Richard 
Friedman, Opportunity for Cross-Examination at Preliminary Proceedings, 
CONFRONTATION BLOG (Aug. 29, 2007), http://confrontationright.blogspot. 
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cross-examination, such as cross-examination at a preliminary 
hearing,112 substitute fully for defense counsel’s trial 
examination.113 Yet even Crawford accepts this practical 
compromise, rather than the exclusion of evidence, to maintain a 
fair adversary process.114 
Working beyond cross-examination as the sole measure of 
confrontation, Crawford recognizes another confrontation 
priority: if the prosecution could not afford a defendant any 
opportunity for cross-examination, even prior to trial, the 
defendant cannot complain about the loss of cross-examination in 
cases where the defendant wrongfully caused the declarant’s 
unavailability.115 The Court has drawn this “forfeiture” exception 
to confrontation from history, but the Court also has noted that 
it is grounded in necessity and equity.116 Surely, a defendant 
cannot purposefully absent a witness from trial and complain 
about an unfair adversary process.117 
At this point, if the defendant could not cross-examine the 
declarant and did not make the declarant unavailable, Crawford 
would prioritize the exclusion of testimonial evidence. This 
evidentiary “stop sign,” however, understandably may have 
prompted members of the Court to curb the confrontation right 
itself by defining testimonial evidence narrowly.118 Crawford 
offered no substantial reasons for the law to stop here in 
                                                          
com/2007/08/opportunity-for-cross-examination-at.html; Richard Friedman, 
Prior Opportunity for Cross-Examination, CONFRONTATION BLOG (Feb. 11, 
2005), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2005/02/prior-opportunity-for- 
cross.html. 
112 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 152 (1970). 
113 Cf. Blanton v. State, 978 So. 2d 149, 154–56 (Fla. 2008) (holding 
that a “discovery deposition” does not constitute a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination under Crawford). 
114 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
115 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145, 158–59 (1878). 
116 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359–61 (2008). 
117 Cf. id. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring in part) (indicating that 
confrontation forfeiture should be triggered by an intent “to thwart the 
judicial process,” or to “isolate the victim from outside help, including the 
aid of law enforcement and the judicial process”). 
118 See Mosteller, supra note 97, at 516. 
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considering practical confrontation priorities consistent with an 
adversary process.119 For example, if the defendant did not 
absent the unavailable declarant, one fairly might ask whether 
the prosecution had any opportunity to supply even pre-trial 
examination of the declarant. If the prosecution sat on its hands 
pending trial, or chose to deny the defense pre-trial access to the 
declarant through discovery limitations, the prosecution will 
have lost its claim to necessity and equity for introducing the 
now-unavailable declarant’s statement at trial. But on the other 
hand, the prosecution’s demonstrated inability to offer even pre-
trial examination of an unavailable declarant should be a relevant 
consideration to a fair adversary process. Dying declarations 
certainly could qualify for this consideration,120 as could victims 
or witnesses who evade the prosecution’s diligent efforts to 
locate them. 
In this circumstance, before excluding the testimonial 
evidence altogether, a court could prioritize exploring whether a 
fair adversary process still could be preserved without cross-
examination of the unavailable declarant. For example, the court 
could order the prosecution to produce witnesses with detailed 
personal knowledge of the unavailable declarant and how the 
                                                          
119 Cf. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 72–75 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) 
(reviewing historical record and concluding, “I am not convinced that the 
Confrontation Clause categorically requires exclusion of testimonial 
statements”); cf. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849–50 (1990) (holding 
that face-to-face confrontation is a preferred but not indispensible part of trial 
confrontation, and thus modified confrontation procedures can be employed 
when necessary, equitable, and fair); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1022–25 
(1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (accepting face-to-face confrontation as a 
confrontation priority, but recognizing that necessity and equity can justify 
alternative procedures that do not deny the defendant the opportunity to test 
the evidence in an adversary process). 
120 I always have found “necessity and equity” as the most persuasive 
argument for admitting a dying declaration over a confrontation objection—
the prosecution simply has no ability to produce this witness for anyone to 
examine, including the prosecution itself, at any time. The argument that a 
dying declaration uniquely should be admissible over a confrontation 
objection solely because of its greater antiquity than other hearsay exceptions, 
cf. Giles, 554 U.S. at 358 (identifying historical bases for testimonial dying 
declarations), too categorically and arbitrarily preferences the old over the 
new in the development of the law. 
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statement was made;121 condition admission on robust pre-trial 
discovery or deposition to enhance defense preparedness for this 
evidence; relax the evidentiary foundations for relevant 
impeachment of the non-testifying declarant or rebuttal of the 
declarant’s statement;122 instruct the jury and permit defense 
argument on the risks of this kind of evidence;123 or hold a pre-
trial hearing to evaluate whether the evidence presents any 
unique risks of unreliability that cannot be confronted fairly 
without the declarant on the witness stand for cross-
examination.124 
This approach recognizes that, in carrying the burden of 
proof, prosecuting lawyers determine whether trial evidence is 
testimonial by how they employ it against the defendant at trial. 
The defendant, however, also is represented by diligent trial 
counsel in an adversary process. In necessary and equitable 
circumstances, competent defense counsel properly may be 
expected to confront prosecution testimony with more than just 
the tool of cross-examination if the law treats confrontation as a 
part of a fair adversary process and not just a rule of evidence 
admissibility.  
By embracing some flexibility in how confrontation rights 
are enforced, I do not mean to minimize the centrality of cross-
examination to this right. Crawford properly ranks cross-
examination at trial as the highest confrontation priority. 
                                                          
121 See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2011) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that while the prosecution did not 
produce the declarant of the testimonial report, “a knowledgeable 
representative of the laboratory was present to testify and to explain the lab’s 
processes and the details of the report”). 
122 See Fred O. Smith, Jr., Crawford’s Aftershock: Aligning the 
Regulation of Nontestimonial Hearsay with the History and Purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1497, 1524–26 (2008). 
123 See id. at 1528. Courts already instruct juries in this manner with 
other types of potentially problematic or unreliable evidence, such as 
cooperating witness testimony, interested witness testimony, missing 
testimony from an uncalled and knowledgeable witness, and identification 
evidence. Rather than exclude this evidence altogether, the law trusts that a 
well-informed jury in an adversary system can weigh the evidence 
appropriately. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728 (2012). 
124 Cf. Smith, Jr., supra note 122, at 1528. 
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Moreover, my approach severely would restrict the 
prosecution’s ability to proceed without producing an available 
declarant, and it further would acknowledge that defendants 
retain confrontation interests even when the prosecution has a 
strong case for proceeding without an unavailable declarant. But 
the point of the confrontation right is an opportunity to test the 
prosecution’s evidence as an adversary. Confrontation should not 
be an all-or-nothing evidence admissibility rule that, while 
reflecting some views of history, ignores how criminal cases can 
be tried—and how judges are likely to decide confrontation cases 
when given an all-or-nothing choice. By imposing an all-or-
nothing choice, Crawford’s commitment to a binary 
confrontation framework seems to assure less confrontation, not 
more: Crawford incentivizes a narrow view of the testimonial 
evidence subject to exclusion, and permits a broad universe of 
non-testimonial evidence that legislatures and courts are free to 
admit at trial without any concern for confrontation priorities. 
I recognize that my suggested vision for confrontation rights 
may invite some of the vices of Roberts. But Crawford is doing 
no better, and perhaps even worse, at reducing judicial 
discretion and decision making uncertainty. Whatever the vices 
of my proposed approach to confrontation, it at least offers the 
competing virtue of honestly acknowledging real-world equity in 
solving confrontation problems in an adversary system. Judges 
already are acknowledging these concerns, just under the guise 
of Crawford’s testimonial evidence framework. Judges by 
necessity are narrowing the definition of the right, rather than 
exploring practical ways to prioritize that right’s enforcement. I 
would rather see this judicial discretion exercised in how 
confrontation is enforced, not in whether that right exists. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
If my assessment of the trajectory of confrontation law is 
accurate, one has to ask what the contribution of Crawford has 
been to constitutional criminal procedure. No doubt, Roberts had 
become a fairly empty confrontation framework that needed 
some meaningful constitutional discipline imposed on it. Yet the 
Supreme Court needs to be cautious about disrupting prevalent 
 Crawford and Beyond 543 
rules of criminal trial procedure without some clear sense of 
where that constitutional project is going, and a judicial 
commitment to get there. That commitment apparently did not 
exist for Crawford. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist thus raised an important question in 
Crawford: In the world of criminal practice, does a shot at 
perfection justify an extended and uncertain journey, perhaps to 
no better a place, or even to someplace worse? I do not know an 
overarching answer to this question. But in retrospect, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist made a pretty good case for a more modest 
effort to refine confrontation doctrine in Crawford—perhaps 
such as bundling a more robust unavailability requirement into 
Roberts.125 An effort of this sort may not have promised 
confrontation perfection, even from the beginning. But it would 
have improved Roberts, avoided years of uncertainty in how 
criminal cases are to be tried, and in the end, may have proved 
about as good as where Crawford appears to have delivered us. 
 
                                                          
125 See generally Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for 
Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1016–17 (1988) (reviewing the 
weakening of the unavailability requirement under Roberts). 
